New Borders for Education: Redefining the Role and Sites of Education in the Future by Mitchell, David
 
  
 
Aalborg Universitet
New Borders for Education: Redefining the Role and Sites of Education in the Future
Mitchell, David
Publication date:
1998
Document Version
Early version, also known as pre-print
Link to publication from Aalborg University
Citation for published version (APA):
Mitchell, D. (1998). New Borders for Education: Redefining the Role and Sites of Education in the Future.
SPIRIT.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            ? Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            ? You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            ? You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at vbn@aub.aau.dk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from vbn.aau.dk on: November 29, 2020
Center for International Studies 
Aalborg University 
New Borders for Education: Redefining the Role 
and Sites of Education in the Future 
David Mitchell 
Discussion Paper No. 3/98 
© David Mitchell 
rSSN 1397-9043 
Published by: 
SPIRIT 
Aalborg University 
Fibigerstrrede 2 
Dk-9220 Aalborg 0, Denmark 
Phone + 459635 91 33 
SPIRIT - School for Postgraduate Interdisciplinary Research 
on Interculturalism and Transnationaiity 
Director: Professor UlfHedetoft 
SPIRIT is an interdisciplinary doctoral school for the systematic study of themes and 
theoretical issues related to the intertwining of political, transnational and intercultural 
processes in the contemporary world. It is dedicated to examining - from the combined 
vantagepoint of both the human and the social sciences - cultural, political and communica-
tive issues on a spectrum ranging from the local dimension over the national and the 
regional to the processes of globalisation that increasingly impinge on the organisation of 
lire and the structure and dynamics of the world. The thematic issues range from questions 
or European identity and integration; over transnational processes of migration, subcultures 
and international marketing; to transatlantic problems or nationalism and religion in Eastern 
Europe or the USA What ties them together within the framework of SPIRIT is the 
scllOol's distinctive features: Analysing themes in the context of tjJ.e meanings and 
implications of internationality, and taking cultural/communicative as well as politi-
cal/sociological aspects into account. Considerable emphasis is placed on Europe - its 
history, politics, social anthropology, place in the world, relations to global issues, and 
trajectories for the future. On this background research is conducted within four thematic 
areas: 
1. Studies ofldentity, Mentality and Culture 
2. Interculttual Cooperation in International Markets and Organisations 
3. Migration, Spatial Change and the Globalisation of Cultures 
4. International Politics and Culture 
New Borders for Education: 
Redefining the Role and Sites of Education in the Future 
INTRODUCTION 
Challenges Facing Education 
in the 21 st Century 
David Mitchell 
University ofWaikato, New Zealand 
Over a quarter of a century ago, Alvin Toffler (1970) ushered the future into popular 
consciousness. He (and with belated acknowledgment, his wife, Heidi) claimed that 
one of the major qualitative differences between the present (i.e., then 1970) and the 
past is that not only has the scope and scale of change been extended, but its pace 
has been radically altered. Such acceleration of change has a profound effect on life. 
It 'lies behind the impermanence - the transience - that penetrates and tinctures our 
consciousness, radically affecting the way we relate to other people, to things, to the 
entire universe of ideas, art and values' (p.25). As the Tofflers predicted, change 
continues to characterize human existence, and their words remain apposite as we 
contemplate the next quarter century. 
Social and educational planners preparing for the 21 st century should be addressing 
two main issues. Firstly, they should recognize that many of the traditional 'borders' 
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that have impinged upon education are breaking down or are being redefined - trends 
which are likely to accelerate in the future. Already there are signs of dramatic 
changes occurring in the borders between nation-states and the global community, 
between nation-states and their component subcultures, between nation-states and 
the individual, between schools and their communities, between homes and schools, 
between education and work, between business/commerce and learning institutions, 
between formal and informal education, between vocational and academic 
education, between mandatory curricula and individual choice, between learners and 
teachers, between parents and children, between humans and machines, and among 
disciplines. As these new power relationships are negotiated, they wiII inevitably be 
accompanied by tensions, resistance and, in some places, disorder, chaos and threats 
to security and peace. These threats will affect educational institutions, which will 
increasingly become the site of disputation as interested parties seek to win the 
hearts and minds of the future generations. As in no other period in world history, 
education will playa crucial role in determining cultural and ideological positions 
taken within societies. 
Secondly, as alluded to above, planners should recognize that the future will be 
characterized by change - rapid in some countries, gradual in others; systemic in 
some countries, piecemeal in others; advantageous and acceptable to some, but not 
to others; and accompanied by intended as well as unintended consequences. Such 
is the magnitude of change and the rapidity with which it is taking place in most 
societies, that educationists must undertake immediate, bold, and innovatory steps 
to re-engineer all aspects of the education system over which they have some 
measure of control. Failure to do so means abdicating responsibility for education 
in favor of other sectors of society andlor recognizing that in the more affluent 
societies individual learners will take increasing control of their own education. 
While this shift in power may be no bad thing in the sense of democratizing the 
educational process, such a transformation should occur as a deliberate policy choice 
rather than occurring by default. 
But change is not easy to contemplate, let alone implement, as it inevitably involves 
modifying or completely replacing previous habits and existing power structures. As 
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Morgan (1986) notes, all change is a product of tensions between opposites. By 
analyzing those tensions, we have a powerful means of understanding how our world 
is unfolding and can appreciate contemporary events in that light. We may also have 
the will to consciously seek to avoid some changes or to introduce others. The 
changes outlined in this paper will inevitably lead to tensions between: 
global and local: how nations and individuals define the balance between 
world and national citizenship; 
traditional and modern: how nations and individuals blend their cultural 
traditions and customs with the 
culture s of the information age and the emerging 'syncretic' cultures which 
are arising from within- and between-country migration, mostly to urban 
areas; 
centrifugal and centripetal interests (national vs regional and community): 
how societies define what is best governed from the center and what is best 
governed at sub-national levels; 
group and individual: the extent to which individuals seek to retain their 
individuality in the context of increasing demands to adapt to globalized 
cultures and their various subcultural identities; 
all diversities and some diversities: the extent to which, in increasingly 
pluralistic societies, there will be a celebration, acceptance or mere 
tolerance of diversities, either within or between communities; 
public and private: the balance between public and private providers of 
services which, traditionally, were seen to be the responsibility of 
governments; 
welfare state and individual responsibility: the balance between the state 
and individual responsibility for welfare, health and education; 
monopolies and contestability: the extent to which the valuing of diversity 
will lead to demands for greater choice and competition, with a 
corresponding decline in public monopolies; 
high choice and low choice: the extent to which societies seek to maximize 
individual choice, especially when such choice may lead to or exacerbate 
social inequalities; 
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inclusion and separation: the extent to which the exercise of choice may 
result in more or less inclusivist societies; 
change-embracing and change-avoiding: the extent to which societies, 
institutions and individuals recognize, embrace and adapt to change. 
This paper will analyse five socio-political and technological trends and how they 
will impact on the education systems in a range of societies: globalization, 
demographics, pluralization, technology, and the nature of work 
The scope of the paper will be the next 25 years. Predicting future trends in 
education in any particular society is fraught with difficulties, not least because its 
character is the resultant of a myriad of interacting forces. Chaos theory informs us, 
too, that even small initial perturbations in a system can have major repercussions 
in the long term. While it is impossible to predict with certainty what the future will 
be like, many aspects can be anticipated and prepared for and certain aspects are 
subj ect to some control. After all, the future is something which we are all creating 
righ.t now through our actions and our inactions. Education, like no other field of 
human endeavor, is, or should be, focused on the future. 
To analyse these trends and do justice to the wealth ofliterature associated with each 
one is admittedly an ambitious project - and one that will only briefly be developed 
in this paper. ! As Boulding (1956, p.4) stated many years ago, 'All we can say about 
practically everything is almost nothing' . But a contrary view was expressed more 
recently by Hagerstrand (1986, p.193) who argued that 'It is urgent to take a fresh 
look at the matter and see if it is not possible after all to say something useful about 
at least a considerable amount of everything at the same time'. The latter view is 
taken by the author, if for no other reason that we expect educational planners and 
policy-makers to take ' everything' into account. 
I The Author is currently writing a book. !entariveiy entiiled New borders in education: Refinding the role 
and sites of education in rhe fu ture, which is under consideration by Lawrence Erlbaurn 
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An important caveat must be registered from the outset: although there are many 
shared features among countries, it is critical that account be taken of the different 
circumstances and the different ways in which the macro factors outlined will impact 
on individual countries. Variations, some of considerable magnitude, can be 
expected of countries with different levels of economic development, with different 
resources, with different political systems, with different demographic profiles, wi1:h 
different degrees of cultural homogeneity, and with different histories. 
GLOBALIZATION 
This section will examine the contrasting positions taken by those who perceive a 
convergence of cultures (e.g. Fukuyama, 1992) and those who see the post-Cold WaT 
world leading to a reconfiguration along cultural lines (e.g. Huntington, 1996). The 
thesis explored is that there is probably truth in both positions and that whatever the 
mix of values that emerges in different countries, there will be profound implications 
for education. 
The future will see an increasing emergence of global shared values as a result ofthe 
rapid development of communications, access to media and the free movements I()f 
goods and peoples. Related to this development will be the erosion of nation.al 
sovereignty, with decisions taken by international bodies reducing the freedoms oof 
nation-states to take decisions about affairs and issues within their own countries. 
The trend towards globalization is the product of such factors as the emergence <of 
a global economy, the growth ofintemational trade (facilitated by such bodies astbe 
World Trade Organization and its predecessor, the General Agreement on Trade and 
Tariffs), the deregulation of capital movement and the corresponding expansioD <of 
foreign direct investment, the development of transnational corporations, the 
increase in tourism, the development of intergovernmental and quasi supranation.al 
institutions, the establishment of regional political federations and alliances, and tbe 
expansion of transnational cultural links (Held, 1991; Oman, 1994; Ostry, 199 5; 
Smelser, 1993). A significant part of this trend is the growth of global work, wh~re 
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individuals and organizations are increasingly operating across national boundaries 
and creating strategic partnerships and alliances (O'Hara-Devereaux & Johanson, 
1994). 
To these economic and geopolitical factors, we must add two others. Firstly, the 
irnpactofincreasing communications interconnectivity (Negroponte, 1995) will lead 
to many of the values of the nation-state giving way to those of both larger and 
smaller electronic communities, with their own cultures (Rheingold, 1993). 
Increasingly, we will socialise in digital neighborhoods and engage in electronic 
commerce on a global scale (Butler, 1996). Secondly, as Oman (1994) notes, 
environmental threats such as global warming and ozone depletion are increasingly 
seen as being beyond the capacity of even the most powerful governments acting 
alone to control or correct, thus requiring a concerted global response. 
Cultural convergence is the thesis argued by Fukuyama (1992) in his controversial 
book, The End oj History and the Last Man, in which he goes so far as to suggest 
that as countries modernize they must increasingly resemble one another, regardless 
of their historical origins or cultural inheritances. This homogenization reflects the 
universal economic nexus of modem consumerism, which centers around 
technologically-driven economic growth and the capitalist social relations necessary 
to produce and sustain it. 
A contrary vIew IS taken by Huntington (1996) in his book, The Clash Of 
Civilizations and the Remaking oj World Order, when he argues that culture and 
cultural identities are shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict 
in the post-Cold War world. 
Whichever view prevails (and it is likely that there will be both convergence and 
divergence, depending on the factor that is being considered and the particular 
nation-state and its cultural make-up and history), it is clear that disputes are bound 
to occur, old tensions will continue and new ones will appear. Just as these will 
impact on education, so too will (or should) education play an increasingly important 
role in helping to minimize tensions in the future by promoting mutual 
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understanding, peaceful interchange and hannony. In education, as in other areas 
of human activity, there will be ongoing, ifnot increased, tensions between the trend 
towards international homogenization and the retention of national or regional 
cultural identities. This will lead to national and sub-national governments 
redefining what they consider to be their core, non-negotiable societal and 
educational values, in the light of any global consensual values. 
The trend towards globalization is seen by some commentators as changing the 
notion of democracy. Held (1991), for example, notes that as many human activities 
are increasingly organized on a global level, democracy comes under tlueat. He 
explains this in part by noting that one of the underlying premises of democracies 
is that they can be treated as essentially self-contained units (i.e., nation- states), 
clearly demarcated from one another, giving expression to the interplay of forces 
operating within them, and reflecting what he tenns 'a national community offate' 
(p.202). Such a view of governance - and hence the very notion of democracy - is 
increasingly being challenged by the intensification of regional or global 
interconnections. The meaning of national democratic decision'making will 
increasingly be considered in the context of a complex international society with a 
huge range of regional and global institutions which transcend national boundaries. 
Held (1991) summarizes this trend as follows : 
.. the operation of states in an ever more complex international system both limits their autonomy and 
impinges increaSingly upon their sovereignty. (emphasis in original) Any conception of sovereignty which 
interprets it as an illimitable and indivisible fonn of public power is undennined. Sovereignty itself has to 
be conceived today as already divided among a number of agencies· national, regional and international · 
and limited by the very nature of this plurality (p. 222) . 
Reich (1991) takes this theme even further, stating somewhat hyperbolically that in 
the future global society, 
There will be no national products or technologies, no national corporations, no national industries. There 
will be no longer be national economies, at least as we have come to understand that concept. All that will 
remain rooted within the national borders are the people who comprise a nation. Each nation's primary 
assets will be its citizens' skills and insights. Each nation 's primary assets will be to cope with the cenirifugal 
forces of the global economy which tear at the ties binding citizens together - bestowing even greater wealth 
on the most skilled and insightful, while consigning the less skilled to a declining standard ofliving (pJ). 
Notwithstanding Reich's prognostication - one with which other writers such as Hirst 
& Thompson (J 995) would disagree - the important point is not the demise of the 
7 
nation-state, per se, but more an acknowledgment of 'a challenge to the era of 
hegemonk states' (Held, 1991, poll!)_ 
Im terms of education, recent years have seen what McNeely & Cha (1994) refer to 
as 'a remarkable degree of convergence in both educational ideology and 
eoducational structure across all types of nation states'. This phenomenon has also 
been noted by writers such as Adick (1992) and Meyer, Kamens, & Benevot (1992), 
who observe that 'modern' schooling systems have already spread throughout the 
world at the expense of'autochthonous' systems. The 'modern' form has in common 
features such as: 
a more or less differentiated school system with sub-divisions into school classes, levels and 
graduation qualifications; 
teaching according to a pre-arranged curriculum; 
a systematic differentiation between teaching and learning, so that professional staff of teachers 
appears before a class of school children at scheduled time intervals; 
a state controlled, public, legal regulation of educational practices in schools etc (Adick, 1992). 
To a large extent, this convergence reflects the trend towards nation-states becoming 
increasingly subject to world-level ideological prescriptions and practices, as 
mediated by such agencies as the UN, The World Bank and OECD. Such agencies 
exercise considerable authority, according to McNeely and Cha, influencing national 
systems through a number of normative and rule-creating activities, four in 
particular. Firstly, international organizations act as a major forum for the 
transnational exchange of ideas and information via their publications, through the 
provision of consultants, and by sponsoring various types of conferences, meetings, 
and workshops. Secondly, in order to become members of these international 
organizations, countries have to sign up to their charters and constitutions, which 
typically contain professions of adherence to global principles, norms, and 
procedures. A third and related means of bringing about international convergence 
can be found in standard-setting instruments such as declarations and 
recommendations. Although these may not be legally binding, 'they may be both 
inspirational and educational'. Finally, and in some circumstance perhaps most 
importantly, international organizations exert their influence through direct financial 
assistance or through the provision of development experts, both of which are 
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usually linked to the adoption of certain ideas and policies. Two instances will 
suffice. 
Firstly, one of the major detenninants of international convergence of policies and 
practices in social areas is undoubtedly The World Banle As noted by Torres 
(1995-96), The World Bank is already a major player in the transnationalization of 
knowledge, influencing the discourse of education and educational refonns, not only 
in developing countries, but worldwide. The underlying ideology thus projected is 
neoliberalism. The World Bank made its first loan for education in 1963 and is now 
the largest single source of external financing for education in developing countries, 
accounting for about a quartei: of all such aid (The World Bank, 1995). In 
developing countries, it has the ultimate influence to bring about change: money. In 
its own words, 'Bank financing will generally be designed to leverage spending and 
policy change by national authorities ' (The World Bank, 1995, pp.14-15). Its 
priorities for educational refonn therefore bear close study in the broader context of 
forces underlying the transfer of ideology and knowledge. In a recent publication, 
these were summarized as being in six key areas: (a) giving higher priority to 
education, (b) setting priorities with reference to outcomes, (c) emphasizing basic 
education, (d) attending to equity, (e) involving households in the governance of 
schools, and (f) granting schools the autonomy to use instructional inputs according 
to local school and community conditions, with accountability to parents and 
communities. 
Secondly, the UN agencies aspire to influence global values. At a broad level, the 
World Commission on Culture and Development (1995) has recently identified 
'recurrent themes that appear in nearly all cultural traditions', and goes on to argue 
that these could 'serve as an inspiration for a global ethics' (p.36). Five such 
principles are adduced: human rights and responsibilities, democracy and the 
elements of civil society, the protection of minorities, commitment to peaceful 
conflict resolution and fair negotiation, and equity within and between generations. 
With a more specifically educational focus, the recent report of the International 
Commission on Education for the Twenty-first Century (UNESCO, 1996) put 
forward the notion that quality education should have four pillars: 
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learning CO know: broad general education and in-depth work on selected subjects, learning to learn 
to continue education through life; 
learning to do: ability to face a variety of situations, often unforeseen; to work in teams - hence 
work experience incorporated with education~ 
learning (0 be: exercising independence and judgment, combined with sense of personal 
responsibility for attaining common goals; understanding and realizing one's talents: memory, 
reasoning, imagination, aesthetic sense, physical, leadership; 
learning 10 live together: among individuals, groups, nations; developing an understanding of 
others and their history, traditions and spirituality (pp.7-8). 
o fthese pillars, the fourth is given priority. In the words of the Commission, 
tIl,far-reaching changes the traditional patterns of human existence require of us a better understanding of 
other p eople and the world at large. There is a need for mutual understanding, peaceful interchange and, 
indeed, harmony - the very things that are most lacking in our world today (p.7). 
International bodies and world and regional forums will thus play an increasing role 
in determining the values, aims and even the curriculum of education. As this role 
increases, however, there will be disputation as to how such power is exercised, both 
in terms of who represents the views of nation-states and how decisions are arrived 
at in international forums. There will be a rising concern about the direct and indirect 
influences exercised by dominant world powers - particularly the United States. 
Nevertheless, most education systems around the world now seem to be facing up 
to the issue of globalization and are seeking to develop strategies which take this 
phenomenon into account. Later sections will address how this trend is forcing 
educational policy-makers to consider the implications of technology and the 
changing nature of work as they plan to make their country more competitive in the 
global marketplace. In that sense, there are and will be strong impulses towards 
cultural convergence. But, is this a 'good thing'? As Barth (1996), reminds us , 
'Global cultural diversity represents a precious form of capital or resource, 
comparable to biodiversity' (p.26). 
DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS 
In the first few decades of the 21 st century, demographic transitions, all of which 
have been under way for some time, will lead to many changes in the social 
structures of nation-states and the transactions that take place within them. Some 
even have the potential to influence the relationships between nation states. All will 
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impact on the resourcing, content, sites and processes of education. As Pool .& 
Bedford (1996, p.2) note, 'Demographic transition, particularly its dynamics, 
constitutes perhaps the most radical form of social change a society may face' . They 
further note that while economic inequalities appear to be growing, there is a large 
degree of demographic convergence, with significant decreases in both fertili ty and 
mortality across most of the world outside Africa. 
This section will outline four inter-related demographic transitions: fertility, t ami ly 
formation, mortality, and migration and will conclude with some comments on tbe 
implications of population projections for the notion ofa 'whole world econ()my-'. 
Fertility Transition 
Over the past two centuries, the fertility rate - the number of children an average 
woman will bear over her lifetime - has steadily declined in developed countries 
(Pool & Bedford, 1996). In the United States, for example, the rate has gone fron 
7.0 in 1800, to 3.6 in 1900, to roughly 2.0 today (US Council of Economic Advisers 
(1997). Major exceptions to this trend occurred with the 'baby bust' associated wi-tll 
the Great Depression and World War II, when the fertility rate was bel()-w 
replacement level (i.e., currently 2.05 births per women in low mortali-ty 
populations) and with the post-World War II 'baby boom' which lasted until tbe 
early 1970s. However, these two events are generally perceived to be but tempoTa:I)' 
aberrations in a long-run trend of declining fertility. The rate of this decline has been 
particularly marked over the past four decades, with fertility rates across all 
industrialized countries plummeting from 2.77 in 1955·1960 to 1 .91 in 1975-1980 
and 1.70 in 1990·1995 (Lutz, 1996). 
In more recent times, this major demographic transition has been manifested in most 
developing countries as well, to the point that after reviewing the evidence fro-:rn 
1960 to 1995, Cleland (1996) concluded that ' sustained fertility decline in the Thi:rd 
World is now the norm rather than the exception' (p.69). Notwithstanding this trea.<i, 
the impact of declining fertility in these countries is offset by other demograplJ:ic 
forces such as declining mortality and the present number people in the reproductive 
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alles so that in, in many developing countries, its impact will not be felt until well 
into the next century. 
This widespread fertility transition should not be allowed to obscure significant 
between-country and within-country variations. An example of the fonner is the 
o(;currence in several countries, mainly industrialized ones, of fertility rates that are 
c()llsiderably below replacement. Those with fertility rates below 1.50 include Italy, 
Spain, Gennany, Austria, Switzerland, Greece, Portugal, Japan, Hong Kong, Macau, 
S~uth Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, as well as many of the East Europe transition 
countries (especially Bulgaria, the Czechoslovak Republic, Latvia, Romania, 
Ukraine, and Croatia (Cleland, 1996; Lutz, 1996; McDonald, 1997). Indeed, in these 
c<luntries, according to McDonald (1997), present levels of fertility are so low that, 
if maintained in the long tenn, they would threaten the future existence of the 
peoplesconcemed. For example, with the level offertility applying in 1995, Italy's, 
population size would drop in just 100 years to only 14 percent of its current level, 
SJlain to 15 percent Germany to 17 percent Greece to 26 percent, and Japan to 28 
percent. Within-country variation in fertility rates is present in many, if not most 
c<Juntries. For example, in India transition is most advanced in the southern states, 
n ctably Kerala and Tamil Nadu with fertility rates of 2.0 and 2.5 respectively, 
whereas in most northern states, fertility remains high with rates ranging between 
3 .6and4_8 (Cleland, 1996). 
What then accounts for this almost universal convergence towards lowered fertility 
rates? Here it is helpful to examine possible reasons for the very low fertility rates 
aIJlong and within certain countries, as noted above. Various factors seem to be 
associated with this phenomenon: (a) in some low fertility countries child-bearing 
(or at least having more than one or two children) leads to significant psychic and 
economic opportunity costs if women can no longer participate in paid employment, 
tbis being particularly the case when working conditions such as the availability of 
p:arHime -work, liberal conditions for absence and the provision of quality child care 
aIre not put in place; (b) in some countries, proscriptions against relationships 
antemative to marriage and the continuance of generally socially conservative 
attitudes t<lwards family functioning (e.g., adherence to a 'male breadwinner' model, 
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rather than a 'gender equity' model) inhibit an increasing number of young people 
from marrying and having children; (c) the direct economic costs of having children, 
a factor that is becoming increasingly an issue in those countries that have embraced 
the new liberal economics where, for example, there is a greater emphasis on 'user 
pay' for education, health and welfare services and where employment conditions 
have become less flexible; (d) the rising age of marriage, particularly in the low 
fertility countries in East Asia; (e) an increasing acceptance and use of effective birth 
control measures; (f) the overall status of women (for example, Cleland (1996) 
ascribes the different fertility rates within India largely to the differential literacy 
rates among women: 87 percent in Kerala vs 20-30 percent in the north); (g) a trend 
towards individualism and mobility which means that more and more people are 
increasingly reluctant to enter into long-tenn commitments such as marriage and/or 
the raising of children; and (h) the availability of housing space, a factor that will 
take on increasing import with the rapid urbanization taking place in most societies 
(Cleland, 1996; Gustavsson and Stafford 1994; Lutz, 1996; McDonald, 1997) 
The educational implications of these trends vary from country to country. Three 
main categories need to be considered: countries with high fertility rates, but with 
policies to decrease them more rapidly than their current trajectories; countries 
whose fertility rates are considered to be optimal, or to be approaching optimal 
levels; and countries who wish to increase their fertility rates. Clearly, the social and 
educational implications will vary according to whichever grouping is being 
considered. For the first group, educational programs would aim to increase the 
educational levels of girls and women (there are, of course, other imperatives why 
this should occur), include instruction in birth control principles and procedures, and 
seek to encourage the development of greater gender equity in both the content and 
process of education. For the third group, it means supporting through favorable 
employment and social conditions the continued participation of women in the 
workforce, the provision of expanded quality preschool and after-school childcare, 
educating society into seeing children as valuable resources for future economic and 
psychic well-being, and re-examining the wisdom of education fees. The second 
group will need to adopt a mix of these policies, depending how close they are to 
their optimal fertility levels. 
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Family Formation Transition 
In many developed countries, family formation ('how and when couples fonn a 
union, have children, and then see the family dissolve through attrition and rupture ' 
(Pool & Bedford, 1996, p.6») has undergone a major changes over the past century 
or so, particularly in the last 30 years. These include (a) the change from the 
relatively early and relatively universal acceptance of registered marriage of the 
'baby boom' era to the more recent later marriage and increasing preference for 
cohabitation as the first form of conjugal union (Pool & Bedford, 1996); (b) the 
Il1ultiplicity of kinship types in the modern family; (c) the movement away from 
patriarchal authority, to a greater emphasis on the personal autonomy of all 
bousehold members; (d) the greatly increased participation of mothers in the labor 
force (e.g., in the United States in 1960 only 18.7 percent of married women with 
preschool children were in the workforce, compared with 61.7 percent in 1994); (e) 
an increasing trend towards 'one-parent' families, especially among minority 
populations; and (f) increased rates of divorce (Furstenburg, 1997). 
'These trends have significance for education. Teachers can no longer assume that 
IIlost children live in traditional nuclear families with a 'mother' and a 'father'; 
instead diverse and rapidly changing family forms must be taken into account and 
given full recognition, for example in the classroom discourse and in the selection 
of reading material. An increasing number of families lack the resources to take on 
'-Vhat llsed to be considered the sole prerogative of families, leaving schools and 
other educational settings as the only universally accessed institution (at least in 
developed countries) to fill the vacuum - a situation that will increasingly lead to the 
formation of'full service' schools (Dryfoos, 1996) in which there is 'school-linked 
services integration' (Kagan & Neville, 1993). This would see schools as one-stop 
centers where many of the educational, psychological, health, recreational, juvenile 
justice, religious and social requirements of students and their families are addressed 
in a holistic fashion. Here, too, adequate childcare and after-school and summer 
activities should be provided to support those families who find themselves under 
pressure. 
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Mortality Transition 
Paralleling the fertility transition, there has been a significant decrease in mortality 
levels in many parts of the world, particularly in developed countries. In most 
developing countries, too, there has been a significant decline in mortality rates. A 
major exception to this latter trend is the result of the impact of AIDS which began 
spreading in the early 1980s. This disease has currently reached a level of 2.4 
milIion new HIV infections each year among adults, with I million in Asia anti I 
million in Africa, particularly in sub-Sahara Africa, and a cumulative total world-
wide of 18.5 million (WHO, 1995). This latter figure is expected to grow to 30-40 
million by the year 2000 (WHO, 1994), with some estimates even higher. Bongaarts 
(1996) reviews literature which predicts even higher levels, noting mod el 
simulations of parts of Africa in which a majority of adults could become infected. 
He concludes, however. that although the AIDS epidemic will have a significa.nt 
moderating effect on population in sub-Sahara Africa, even under high varia.nt 
projections the overall population growth rate remains high. 
In developed count taken together, have resulted in a gradual upward shift in the age 
structures over the last two centuries, with 40 percent aged 0-14 and less than 7 
percent 65+ some 200 years ago, compared with less than 20 percent and more than 
15 percent, respectively, today (Loriaux, 1990; Pool & Bedford, 1996)_ In the United 
States, the latter figure is expected to reach 23 percent by 2030 (Fosler, 1992). The 
west is thus moving to form an age structure in the shape of an inverted pyralllid 
(McDonald, 1997). Expressed another way, according to the US Council of 
Economic Advisors on the Challenge of an Aging Population, when Social Security 
was enacted in 1935, life expectancy at 65 was about 12 years for men and 13 years 
for women. Now, those figures are 15 and 19 years respectively and by 2070 they 
are projected to be 18 and 22 years (US Council of Economic Advisers (1997). 
Several factors contribute to the aging of a popUlation, according to Pool & Bedford 
(1996): declines in fertility means that there are fewer and fewer in each birth cohort 
(,structural aging'); low mortality produces improved survivorship over younger and 
middle age, resulting in more people reaching older ages (,momentum aging'); and, 
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since 1970 or so, improved survivorship has resulted from health care advances. 
The third of these factors draws attention to what could be considered a transition 
in its own right - the epidemiological transition. As noted by Omran (1982), at the 
start of this transition, communicable diseases cause most death, the greatest force 
of mortality falls at the youngest ages and female life expectancy may be lower than 
male. By the last stages of the transition, non-communicable causes dominate, the 
force of mortality falls at the oldest ages and female longevity significantly exceeds 
male. Developed countries have effectively made this transition and many 
developing countries are making significant advances in this direction. 
Pool & Bedford (1996) note that his transition is affected by both socioeconomic and 
biD-medical factors. At all periods of the transition both operate, but the balance 
between them shifts, with socio-economic factors being the more important earlier 
on, and bio-medical factors more significant in later phases. 
On the horizon are even more significant advances in understanding human biology, 
especially in genetics. Leading the way in these developments will be the Human 
Genome Project, the outcomes of which will increase understanding of the precise 
nature of the changes in genetic material associated with various diseases, and also, 
in many cases, to new methods of treatment. A major application in this field will 
see the discovery of the genetic etiology of many disabling conditions. At a 
metaphysical level, these advances have the capacity to alter the way we see 
ourselves. Kavka (1994, p.l73), for example, speculates that 'we will see ourselves-
not God, not chance, not even nature - as ultimately responsible for the human 
future' an awareness which is a prescription for ' a tormented collective soul ... and 
... intense political conflict' . 
The increasing absolute numbers and proportion of elderly persons will have 
considerable repercussions on all aspects of society, not least of which education. 
One of the key issues is whether welfare and health entitlements based on age can 
be sustained in the future. As noted by the US Council of Economic Advisors on the 
Challenge of an Aging Population, when the large baby boom cohorts enter the age 
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of retirement, federal outlays on the Social Security program and on health programs 
(Medicare and Medicaid) will rise sharply. While current expenditure on these lcey 
social programs represents less than 9 percent of GDP, that proportion is projected 
to rise to 19 percent in 2050 and to 22 percent in 2070. These figures compare with 
the 18 percent of GDP currently raised through federal revenues. Thus, unless 
reforms are instituted, the three maj or entitlement programs could consume all 
government revenues by 2050 and exceed them thereafter. This would affect all 
other areas of government spending, including education. A second issue is tlJe 
challenge to education providers to set up relevant education opportunities Ear 
elderly people. In the future they will constitute an increasing market, with unique 
expectations as to content and delivery of education. Meeting their educational needs 
could well force educators to adapt new paradigms of instruction, with the potential 
for flow-on effects throughout education systems. A third issue is how can t1:ie 
experience and skills of retired people continue to be utilized, for example in 
education? Voluntary work in schools and in out-of-school programs, if properly 
organized and appropriately recognized, could be an avenue of mutual benefit to 
young and old alike. 
MIGRATION 
In recent years, many countries, especially developed countries, have experienced 
an increase in their ethnic diversity resulting from migration· a trend that seems 
likely to continue. As noted by Arizpe (1996), over the last three decades, the United 
States heads the list of countries of immigration, having received 7.3 million legal 
and 2.7 million illegal immigrants. Between 1980 and 1992, Western Europe as a 
whole received some 15 million immigrants, while the Persian Gulf received 5.1 
million. According to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNFP A , 
1993), it is estimated that 70 million people, mostly from developing countries, are 
working, legally or illegally, in other countries and that over one million people 
emigrate pennanently to other countries and close to that number seek asylum each 
year. This massive movement of people reflects several factors: decolonization, 
forced movement of people through war and political repression, transport 
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improvements, economic incentives and family reunions. 
For th.e United States, the consequences of this movement of people, coupled with 
differential fertility rates among different ethnic groups, are that Afiican Americans 
are expected to grow from 12.7% of the population in 1996 to 14.4% in 2030, 
Hispanics from 10.5% to 18.9%, and Asian and Pacific Island people from 3.7% to 
7.0'Yo (US Bureau of the Census, 1997). Currently, the foreign-born population of 
the US stands at 24.5 million, or 9.3 percent. (US Commission on Immigration 
Reform, 1995) 
The geographical spread and mobility of the world population has socioeconomic, 
political and cultural significance (Arizpe, 1996; Castles &. Miller, 1993; Pool & 
Bedford, 1996). For example, Arizpe notes that 'such massive population shifts, 
coupled with the expansion of media and telecommunications, will completely alter 
cultural patterns, behaviour and generational fonns of cultural transmission' (p.96), 
ushering in an era in which the central processes will be 'those of transhumant 
cultures and neo-cultures - new syncretic cultures, most of them urban' (p.97). 
Ethnic diversification also raises issues of major import for education, including the 
role of multicultural vs assimilationist policies and how these impact on curriculum 
development, the representation of different ethnic groups in tertiary education and 
in different kinds of work, and affinnative action and anti-racism programs. These 
will be discussed in more detail in section 5. 
Sev~n Billion, Nine Billion ... People 
Evell with the most rapidly declining fertility scenario, it is reasonable to assume 
that the population of the world will increase from just under 6 billion in 1998 to just 
over 7.5 billion by 2020 and nearly 9 billion by 2040 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 
1997). The intersection of this trend with what Barth (1996) and Goodland et al. 
(1991) call the 'full world economy' poses enonnous economic, environmental and 
soci al challenges that will become increasingly acute in the coming decades. In 
brief, the 'full world economy' theory argues that industrial productive activity has 
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passed a fateful threshold of scale in relation to the global ecosystem. In the 'empty 
world economy', such as we have known until recently, the ecosystem's 'source 
functions' (i.e., energy and natural resources) have been treated as infinitely 
replenishable and capable of fulfilling the economic subsystem's needs, while its 
'sink functions' (i.e., its capacity to dissipate and recycle waste and pollution) have 
been assumed to have almost infinite capacity. In recent years, both of these 
assumptions have been negated and there is a growing recognition that 'the 
economic subsystem has grown swiftly while the global ecosystem remains finite 
or even marginally reduced in scale' (Barth, 1996, p.22). Thus, the notion of a 'full 
world economy' in which the finiteness of natural resources and the limits of the 
biosphere to absorb waste is increasingly being advocated and slowly being 
recognized. 
Such a transition in economic thinking - if it is embraced - will have considerable 
consequences, not least for education as new generations are prepared for life in a 
full world economy. Quite simply, we will have to recognize that there are limits to 
industrial production and to the materialism and consumerism that drives a good 
deal of it. We will have to take much more seriously the protection of the biosphere 
on which we live and on which we hope our descendants will also be able to live. 
And then there is the moral question of how to provide opportunities for the poor 
populations of the world, especially in developing countries, to access even the basic 
commodities of current technical and industrial production. It is all very well to 
make pleas to 'save the planet' and adopt a full world economic paradigm when there 
are such enormous discrepancies between those who currently, and are likely to 
continue, enjoying so many of the fruits of empty world economic thinking, and 
those who are deprived of them. To Barth (1996), this raises questions of the 
contradictions inherent in third world development programs. He argues that it 
would be immoral simply to transfer lifestyles of the North to the South. Instead, 'It 
is imperative .. [to] find effective, practical ways to enhance the integrity of other 
lifestyles to resist these trends and re-create the forces of production and visions of 
the good life that are more benign in their consequences in a full world' (p.28). 
However, it could well be argued that the genie is out of the bottle and it would be 
impossible, if not presumptuous, for the North to seek now to impose such positions 
19 
on the South - and on communities within their own borders. 
PLURALIZATION 
Paralleling the trend toward globalization will be a second trend, in which societies 
(at least in the West) will become increasingly diverse, with an increasing range of 
accessible sub-cultural options and a growing divergence of specialist and 
subcultural discourses. Just as the nation-state is being eroded from above, as it 
were, so too is its character being modified from pressures from below, especially 
when its boundaries are based on arbitrary past political decisions. According to 
Smelser (1993), for example, the state's boundaries are being increasingly contested 
by 'the efflorescence and revitalization of solidarity groupings with multiple bases -
regional, linguistic, religious, ethnic, gender and life-style - as well as a bewildering 
array of novel social movements that generate their own solidarity' (p.3). In a similar 
vein, the New London Group (1996) argues that we live in an environment where 
subcultural differences - differences of identity and affiliation - are becoming more 
and more significant. Gender, ethnicity, generation and sexual orientation are just 
a few of the markers of those differences. Contributing to this notion of increasingly 
decentralized and diversified societies is the emergence of less regulated, multi-
channel media systems, with their burgeoning variety of text forms (Negroponte, 
1995). This trend is apparent in the effects of information technology on facilitating 
networking among geographically dispersed minority groups, both within nation-
states and among groups from different countries (for example, indigenous cultures). 
A sixnilarpoint had been made earlier by Toffler (1981, 1990) who, in describing the 
' third wave' of the information age, referred to its effects in tenns of the 
'demassification' and 'de-synchronization' of society, in which societies cease to be 
-undifferentiated masses and become instead a collection of minority interests. 
~ related factor leading to the erosion of the nation-state, according to the New 
=:Lon<lon Group (1996), is that over the past two decades the century-long trend 
-towards an expanding, interventionist welfare state has been reversed. The group 
:::posi~s that recent trends towards economic rationalism, privatization, deregulation 
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and the transfonnation of public institutions such as schools so that they operate 
according to market logic, are changes that are part of a global shift coinciding with 
the end of the Cold War. The argument between communism and capitalism, they 
say, turned out to be one about the role of the state in society. Injust a decade or so, 
a new world order of liberalism that eschews the primacy of the state has prevai led 
globally. 
These trends may ultimately lead to what Nozick (1976), writing from a radical 
libertarian perspective, portrays as a greatly diminished nation state. Such a state 
would retain responsibility only for the physical and legal protection of its citizens 
and would leave all other matters for individual decision. Thus would a framewprk 
for 'utopia' be established, with individuals being free to detennine its features for 
themselves. Nozick suggests that in such a state, various communities would evolve, 
where groups of people shared common interests and concerns. This would assume 
that individuals have developed as autonomous persons who are capable offonning 
a conception of their own good, that they have developed a capacity for rational 
decision-making. As well, Nozick and others writing from a libertarian perspective 
see the market as being the most efficient and effective provider of social justice; if 
left to operate freely it will fairly deliver resources. It is not for the state to interfere 
in such processes, but rather to recognize that people are entitled to what tlaey 
produce. Nozick's ultimate extension of the notion of pluralism to individualism, 
with the nation-state playing virtually no role in social and economic redistribution, 
has been severely criticized by writers who espouse the notions of social justice 
advanced by John Rawls (1973). For example, Rizvi and Lingard (1993) note that 
Rawls advances two principles: (i) each person should have the most extensive basic 
liberty compatible with similar liberty for others, and (ii) there should be equal 
distribution of primary social goods, unless unequal distribution is to the advant:.ge 
of the least favored. 
The New London Group (1996) argues that the above trend towards pluralizatLon 
undennines the concept of collective audience and common culture, at least in 
Western societies. Indeed, it promotes the opposite: an increasing range of accessible 
subcultural options and the growing divergence of specialist and subcultural 
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discourses. This shift means that singular national cultures will have less hold than 
they once did. Instead of cultural homogeneity, there will be an increasing amount 
of cultural contestation. As it becomes harder for people to put down roots at all 
levels of society - in the nation-state, and even in local communities - there will be 
a consequent diminution of a sense of identity. 
Trends towards regionalism or localism will impact differentially on different 
communities, with some being capable and motivated to respond to the opportunities 
for increased self determination and others not. This point has been recently 
articulated by Putnam (1993) who, in his study of civic traditions in modem Italy, 
ou tlines vast differences among regions. These differences, he claims, reflect the 
degree of social connectedness that is present. 
It "Would be tempting, but dangerous, to think of the trend towards pluralism as 
justifying the acceptance of all diversities, either as expressed as groups or 
individually. Increasingly, the very existence of particular nation-states will be tested 
in terms of how they reconcile the need to tolerate differences within society, while 
at the same time being prepared to intervene to counteract or eliminate differences 
based on inequalities, especially those based on poverty and disadvantage. 
Notwithstanding the trend towards the diversification of society and the devolution 
of power, it is likely societies will maintain their 'core values', i.e., those values 
which reflect the strong cultural underpinnings to particular nation-states. 
SOIlle people are taking a critical view of pluralization, and its attendant 
'multiculturalism', both in terms of its inevitability and its desirability. Education 
will thus continue to be an arena for considerable debate as to the character of 
society. In most countries, the fragmentation ofthe nation-state will be contested, 
and schools will be one of the major arenas for such contestation, with curriculum, 
teaching, governance and accountability coming under increasing scrutiny. A recent 
example of this is provided in the final report of the US Commission on Immigration 
Reform (1995), in which there was a call for the 'Americanization' of immigrants 
in order that they could be better integrated into national life. This would require 
increased emphases on English classes, naturalization and civics education and 
22 
asserting the primacy of individual rights over the collective_ In the words oftne 
Commission: 
Americanization - by which we mean cultivation of a shared commitment to the American values of liberty, 
democracy, and equal opportunity - is desirable and possible regardless of the national ity, nat ive language , 
or religious background of immigrants and their children. 
Where truly pluralistic societies served by a pluralistic education systems emerge, 
there will be a special obligation on schools to ensure that children develop as 
autonomous persons who are capable offonning a conception of their own good and 
a capacity for rational decision-making. Otherwise they would be unprepared to 
make good decisions on their own behalf about the kind of community they wanted 
to belong to. In tum, this may require the state to intervene rather more in the design 
and conduct of education than would be seen as appropriate by those who take an 
extreme libertarian position. The core values of an education system would thus 
have to include a concern for critical thinking and for civics education. In the 
pluralistic societies of the future, there will be a diversity of public and private 
educational programs and institutions. Increasingly, subcultures within any given 
society will seek to have their interests reflected in education and will seek not only 
to establish their own learning institutions, but also their own curricula. In thi s 
socio-political context, schools will have an important role in ensuring that diversity 
contributes to the wider good of society as a whole. Schools will play an increasing 
role as arbiters of difference. 
TECHNOLOGIZATION2 
Technology is perhaps the most significant of the factors which will drive the future. 
In the next 25 years - and beyond- advances in technology will have profound 
effects on all societies. Infonnation and communications technology (ICT) will 
revolutionize the ways in which we gather, manipulate and communicate 
infonnation in our work, leisure and education. With the substitution of digital fOT 
analog coding, and of fiber optics for copper wiring, infonnation is becoming faster, 
2 This section draws upon Mitchell (1997a) . 
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easier and cheaper to gather, store and transmit. The Internet, with its access to e-
mail and the World Wide Web, is the prime current exemplar of how technology 
facilitates one's capacity to independently reach out and find information. The 
introduction of e-mail has dramatically changed the character and speed of 
communication, with participants able to simultaneously exchange information with 
a large number of people in a way which uniquely combines ease, speed, immediacy 
and (increasingly) cheapness. 
Several features of the Web make up its special character, according to Burbules 
(1995). Firstly, like no other form of information sharing, the Web is fundamentally 
egalitarian in that it gives all people with access to it a forum for expressing their 
views and for seeking and sharing information. Interactive media will soon make it 
possible not only to send and receive information, but to engage in dialogue 
discussion and to transmit information and knowledge unconstrained by distance or 
operating time. In tum, this facilitates the establishment of 'virtual' communities of 
common interest. Secondly, because every node in the Web is linkable to any other 
node; the structure is decentered and non hierarchical. Thirdly, the Web has 
multimedia capability (i.e., it is able to integrate multiple sources and forms of 
information), a feature which has wide-ranging ramifications for how people access 
and remember information, for how they conduct their everyday lives and for what 
they expect of entertainment and education. Networked, multimedia systems will 
provide general , efficient, enduring and multi-modal (as distinct from a hitherto 
predominantly verbal) access to cultural works of nearly every form conceivable 
(McClintock 1995). A related feature of computers arises from their capacity to be 
networked or connected with one another, thus facilitating informational linkages. 
Cornputers are undermining the hegemony of the printed book as a means of 
representing culture. This case is persuasively argued by McClintock (1995) who 
asserts that the content of the curriculum, the design of the classroom, the 
organization of the school day, the motivational strategies employed, the scope and 
sequence of textbooks, and the definition of good teaching practice, have remained 
very stable over the past 400 years. The reason for this is rather simple: the character 
and limitations of printed materials have remained substantially fixed and have 
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determined the educational provisions designed to employ them. Thus, reliance on 
textbooks necessitated the division of knowledge into distinct subjects, the 
organization of the students into grade levels based on similarities of age or 
intellectual ability, the structuring of the school year into fixed days for attendance 
at a particular site, the breaking up of the school day into periods of fixed length, and 
the requirement that students work in unison and at the same pace from a prescribed 
text. 
ICT will have an increasing impact on the formation and maintenance of 
communities. In recent times television has isolated many from other human beings. 
This trend is likely to be maintained, with communities becoming less intimate and 
more isolated as increasing use of the Internet reduces physical contact. As the 
Internet extends its sway, people will be enabled to fonn and maintain 'virtual 
communities' which are not based on geographic proximity. These are communities 
comprising like-minded people who can maintain instant and relatively inexpensive 
contact with each other. The new ICTs will enable challenges to the borders between 
the global community and the nation-state, between the nation-state and its 
constituent sub-cultures, between sub-cultures themselves, and between all of these 
entities and the individual. At the heart of these challenges is the tension between 
centrifugal, or centralizing influences, and centripetal, or decentralizing influences. 
For example, the trend toward the Internet creating a global culture may well be 
resisted as nation-states and the subcultures embedded within them seek to assert the 
uniqueness of their own identities. In dealing with these issues of authority and 
control of the Internet, educationists have several responsibilities. Firstly, they 
should understand and critically analyse what the consequences of technology's 
influences on teaching and learning. Secondly, it is vital that allieamers have at least 
a minimum level of access to the Internet if they are to be given opportunities to 
learn from one of the most important sources of knowledge since the printing press 
was developed. Thirdly, children need help in becoming civic-minded citizens of 
the digital age, in using its machinery in the service of some broader social purpose 
than simple entertainment. They need guidance in managing their new ability to 
connect instantly with other cultures. They need reminders about how to avoid the 
dangers of elitism and arrogance. 
25 
What elements of a culture should be selected for presentation to learners? This 
question lies at the very heart of education, where there has been a long-standing 
debate between proponents of 'cultural literacy', who seek a fairly narrow, canonical 
selection, and advocates of 'multicultural' approaches, who call for a broader, more 
i~clusive selection (McClintock, 1995). ICT, with its facilitation of open access to 
multiple sources of knowledge and the individualization of learning, adds a new 
dimension. But is this what we want? What degree of variety can any society 
sustain? Technology introduces a new dimension into the issue of what should 
comprise the curriculum in any particular society. If access to diverse cultural 
literacies increases, then centripetal forces may well hold increasing sway over 
centrifugal forces in the future in determining the nature of the curriculum. 
Advances in ICT also seriously call into question the traditional division of 
education into units of time (so many years of compulsory schooling, divided into 
so many days, divided into so many hours of class contact time), carried out in 
designated locations (schools, classrooms), taking place in groups of a particular 
composition (classes of a certain size and age, with a single teacher). These 
arrangements can be viewed as a means for synchronizing learners engaging in 
diverse activities in space and time. The new technologies open up options with 
respect to all of these arrangements. They have the capacity to radically transform 
Duman interaction by removing arbitrary barriers to interaction. In particular, they 
allow for the asynchronous use of space and time. 
llndoubtedly, the culture of the school and of teaching will have to undergo dramatic 
change as education systems accommodate to the Information Age. This will be no 
easy shift to bring about. It will be particularly difficult in societies where teaching 
:has been routinized and deskilled. Teachers of the future will need to be intelligent, 
:highly educated, flexible, imaginative, technologically sophisticated, confident 
Jleople who can assist students to manage their own learning. We must be aware that 
the opportunities afforded by ICT and its increasing role in all aspects oflife will not 
be equally accessible to all members of a society, let alone to all societies. This 
:means that there will be growing disparities in knowledge and basic skills between 
those who have access to technology and those who do not· ultimately, between 
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those who can pay and those who cannot. Issues of social justice will have to be 
addressed in parallel with the expansion of ICT into education, lest existing 
disadvantages become compounded. 
For the developments outlined here to occur, high priority will have to be given to 
the pre-service and in-service training of teachers in various rCT approaches. 
Schools of the future will require the services of highly trained, flexible teachers 
who continue to be up-dated (and possibly re-credentialled) in their rapidly changing 
field . Teachers may well feel under threat by the new rCTs and the opportunities and 
challenges they pose. There is no denying that ICT, along with other changes that 
will take place in education in the future , will impact on all sectors of education, not 
least of which on teachers. However, as the International Commission on Education 
for the Twenty-first Century (UNESCO, 1996) points out, these developments do 
not at all diminish the role of teachers - quite the contrary - but they do change it 
profoundly and they offer the opportunities that must be seized. The Commission 
argues that it is therefore essential that teachers ' initial training, and even more so 
their in-service training, should give them a real command of these new tools. They 
also need to be 'sensitized to the profound changes that modem technologies effect 
in our cognitive processes' (p.l74). 
Implementing new technology in schools is far from a straightforward matter, even 
when the surface logic is persuasive. Why is this so, and what can be done about it? 
In a recent analysis of ' technology refusal ' in schools, Hodas (1993) points out that 
what is often overlooked is the fact that schools themselves are a technology, and 
that they are 'systems for preserving and transmitting information and authority, for 
inculcating certain values and practices while minimizing or eliminating others' . He 
argues that perhaps first and foremost, schools are organizations, and as such seek 
nothing so much as their own perpetuation. They are likely to experience change as 
a disruption, an intrusion, as a failure of their defences, particularly if it means that 
in order to implement it, their culture must alter its values and habits. 
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WORK 
Drucker (1994) describes a century of profound change in the nature of work. At the 
start of the century, fanners and domestic servants comprised the largest group of 
workers. By the 1950s, however, industrial workers had become the largest single 
group in every developed country. By 1990 such workers had shrunk to one-fifth of 
the workforce and by 2010 they will be no more than one-tenth. This does not 
suggest a decline in manufacturing production; quite the contrary, as from 1970 to 
1990 in the United States, for example, manufacturing output grew by 250 percent. 
It simply means that manufacturing has become increasingly automated and 
mechanized. 
The change from farmer to factory worker required shifting from one set of manual 
skills to another. But today's new workers will be 'knowledge workers', who must 
shift from their manual skills to a set of theoretical and analytical knowledge that 
can be acquired only through fonnal schooling. Unfortunately, most people in 
developed and developing countries are poorly equipped to compete for these 
positions. They do not leave the current formal schooling system with the skills to 
enter knowledge jobs, nor do they have the skills or the values that will allow them 
to continue to change and adapt. Even the better students in our current systems may 
not meet the standards required of a knowledge-based society. 
Increasingly, technology is placing a premium on particular work skills and 
rendering others obsolete. The Information Age, with its knowledge-based economy, 
demands a range of skills, including the ability to: (a) control complex systems by 
monitoring information about the condition of its parts; (b) flexibly operate in a 
range of social contexts - sometimes in face-to-face teams, sometimes in 
communication with others in diverse locations - often on a global scale, and 
sometimes in isolation from others: in short being able to work within a 'network 
organization'; (c) be self-managing and self-motivating (and, increasingly, self-
employed); (d) adapt to change and acquire new skills, with its corollary of 
willingness to engage in lifelong leaming to upgrade skills and knowledge; (e) work 
in small organizational units, with flat hierarchies and a focus on quality assurance 
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and customer care; (f) deal with widely distributed, very large information storage 
systems; and (g) independently identify, analyse and solve problems calling upon 
higher order thinking (Boyett, & Conn, 1991; Bridges, 1994; Graff, 1996; Jones, 
1995; Jones, 1996; Kefalas , 1994; McClintock, 1995; OEeD, 1989; Swerdlow, 
1995; The World Bank, 1995; UNESCO, 1996; Wirth, 1992). Above all , according 
to Reich (I 99 I), what will increasingly be required are the skills of a symbolic 
analyst. 
The social entity known as a job is vanishing like a species that has outlived its 
evolutionary time, according to Bridges (1994). Advances in technology have 
automated the production line and all but eliminated traditional repetitive tasks. Jobs 
have become rigid solutions to a dynamic problem. In those sectors which are 
accommodating to the demands and opportunities of the information age, maj or 
changes are taking place in the workplace, compared with the mass production era. 
Table 1 summarizes these changes. 
In short, knowledge-based economies place a premium on workers with high 
learning capabilities and with demonstrated competencies in handling infonnation. 
These trends will increase the proportion of workers promoting change and will lead 
to further acceleration of the rate of change. Inevitably, this will lead to tne 
exclusion of a growing proportion of the labor force from work, with attendant costs 
for individuals and for social cohesion. In the US, as Drucker (1994) notes, the 
shrinkage of manual jobs is, above all , a threat to America's most visible minority, 
the Blacks, whose biggest economic gains in the last 30 years came from muving 
into well-paid jobs in the unionized mass-production industries. These effects woald 
be true of many other countries' minority populations. Social and educational policy 
will have to take account of growing disparities in the distribution of knowledge and 
information. 
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Table I . Shifts from Mass Production to Information Age Workplace 
Mass Production Workplace 
making a product 
making products for mass market 
standardized sClVices with more or less routine 
production process 
stable, narrowly defmedjobs/tasks 
requires minor responsibility 
heavy supervision 
requires passive order taking 
hierarchical, vertical organizations 
specific responses to limited number of situations 
deviations handled by specialists 
low use of infonnation and conununications 
technology 
completing tasks more important than continued 
improvement of performance 
specific tasks independent of purpose in 
operation 
computer systems often constrain andlor replace 
human skills 
InformationAge Workplace 
providing a service 
providing customized good and services for niche 
markets 
rapid responses to shifting demand 
comprehensive, open-ended jobs/tasks based on 
projects 
requires high responsibility & critical thinking 
little supervision 
requires active individual initiative 
horizontal, flat, networked, administrative 
structures 
creative solutions to increasingly non-routine 
problems 
deviations handled by lowest level of specialist 
high use of infonnation and communications 
technology 
improving process as important as improving 
product 
work processes are integrated; increased overall 
ownership of product and process 
computer systems often used to complement 
and enhance workforce skills 
(Sources : Alic, 1997, Bridges, 1994; Gee, Hull & Lankshear, 1996; Law, Knuth & Bergman, 1992; 
Reich, 1991 ; The Editors, On the Horizon, 1992). 
The shift towards the knowledge-based economy has several other implications for 
education. Firstly, it is clear that lifelong education must become the norm. This 
trend is seen by some observers as leading businesses to augment, and in some cases 
displace, tertiary education (Davis & Botkin, 1994). This notion of corporate-based 
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learning will be a response to several factors, the shortening of product cycles, 
attempts to leverage the economic value of knowledge, collaborative work patterns, 
a shift in focus from teaching to learning, and the development of networked 
multimedia technology with its capacity to deliver self-paced 'just-in-time'training. 
The future may well see tertiary education institutions re-defining what it is that they 
best can provide for learners, and when they can provide this, compared with new 
models of 'on-the-job' training. Importantly, there will have to be a re-defining of 
the partnership between employers and educational institutions to ensure the 
integration of knowledge in the learner. 
Secondly, the border between 'codified knowledge' and 'tacit knowledge' will 
undergo change, with more of the latter becoming the fonner. Codified knowledge 
is knowledge which can be transfonned into infonnation which can be easily 
transmitted through infonnation infrastructures , compared with tacit knowledge 
which cannot easily be transferred because it has not been stated in an explicit form 
and is extremely sensitive to social context (Foray & Lundvall, 1996). Knowledge 
which can be codified and reduced to infonnation can now be transmitted over long 
distances at very limited cost, thus speeding up the rate of change. This trend calls 
upon education systems to change their rules and infrastructures for recognizing 
people's specific competencies, including assessing their prior learning. 
Thirdly with the shift towards the knowledge-based economy there will be an 
increasing need to re-align vocational education to the requirements for continuous 
problem solving and life-long learning. This may welJ see increased work-based 
learning, job-experience training and school-based enterprises. Whatever the mix of 
provisions, there can be little doubt that the traditional border between vocational 
and academic education will become increasingly blurred as the demands for 
knowledge workers at aU levels of industry increases. 
Fourthly, given that work provides an important source of meaning for many people 
(Guevara & Ord, 1996), but that in many societies there is less work (or, more 
correctly, there are fewer jobs to he carried out by humans) educators will have to 
re-appraise the ways in work which is portrayed in their teaching. 
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A iinal and related point is that the decline in demand for unskilled labor - especially 
in the most developed countries - will have the effect of excluding many people 
fr<>rn participation in the workforce, thus undermining the self concepts of those 
individuals and threatening the social cohesion and security of those societies. 
Ed-ucation systems will have to find effective ways to accommodate to this challenge 
in order to increase opportunities for all to benefit from the knowledge-based 
economy. As a corollary, it behoves societies to establish the conditions in which 
quality, high-value-added, knowledge-intensive jobs in sufficient numbers can be 
created. 
CONCLUSION 
Thispaper presents a brief analysis of five socio-political and technological trends 
tha1 will pose major challenges for education in the 21st century. Firstly, there will 
be an increasing emergence of globalism, with a corresponding erosion of national 
sovereignty. Secondly, major demographic transitions will continue, with profound 
effects on the structure of societies and the transactions that occur within them. 
Thirdly, most societies will become more diverse, with an increasing range of 
subcultural options and pluralistic epistemologies. Fourthly, the revolution in 
information and communications technology will transfonn the nature of work, 
business, entertainment, leisure, interpersonal interactions, and community. Fifthly, 
glo balization and technologization will interact to shift the emphasis away from 
mass production economies to Information Age economies which will place a 
premium on certain work skills and render others obsolete. It must be recognized 
that, as the principle of non-summativity suggests, the whole is greater than the sum 
of the parts and none of the above factors act in isolation from each other. For 
example, the cumulative effects of globalization, pluralization and technologization 
will lead many nations to redefining the nature of their school curricula. 
In fhe face of such far-reaching and comprehensive shifts in society, it is no wonder 
that Gi ddens ( 1995) notes that the world we live in today is not subject to tight 
mastery, but that, on the contrary, 'it is one of dislocation and uncertainty, a 
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"runaway world'" (pJ). In such a transitionary world, human beings are quite 
literally faced with the task of re-Iocating themselves and their institutions - tasks 
which call upon psychological, social, cultural and economic adjustments which, in 
some contexts and for some individuals, are of considerable magnitude. In the 
absence of clear guidelines for planning their lives, many individuals experience 
feelings of confusion, powerlessness and a loss of identity. Educational institutions 
can reasonably be expected to assist with, if not lead, individuals and societies to 
cope with the transformations that will increasingly become imperative. But in order 
to play a constructive role in these tasks, they too must radically change. 
Unfortunately, it is questionable whether many have the capacity, let alone the will, 
to do so. As Reider Roll (1995), Secretary General of the International Council for 
Distance Education, points out, 'as the next decade unfolds, it will be the institutions 
in the education systems which can master the processes of change that will be more 
central and valuable to our societies' (p.12). This point is reiterated by Victor 
Ordonez (1996), Director of the Bangkok office of UNESCO, who asserts that 'the 
road to the future has taken dramatic turns, and unless the educational system of 
nations respond, they will go straight down the cliffs of irrelevance'. He is not 
optimistic that this will occur for 'no sector of society seems more conservative and 
chained to the past than the education sector' (p.7). 
The consequences of thesocio-political and technological trends outlined in this 
paper for education are considerable: the why, where, how and what of education in 
the future will - or, as I have argued, should - undergo dramatic changes. Education 
systems will be challenged to transfonn their missions, their structures and their 
pedagogies. As education systems adapt to the trends there will be changes in (a) 
definitions of the 'educated person' and of the 'good life'; (b) access to education: 
fonnal and informal; (c) the nature of the curriculum: its content, the borders 
between subject domains, its explicit and implicit values, its sequencing, the 
integration of its components, choice and customization, accountability, the 
assessment of learning outcomes, and its responsiveness to different leaming styles; 
(d) the sites of education: homes, schools, workplaces, and formal and informal 
settings; ( e) the mix of control, governance and management of education: 
supranational, national, regional, and local community; (f) the roles ofleamers and 
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teachers; (g) the periodicities of schooling: its length and timing; and (h) the 
qualities of teachers and the nature of teacher education. 
However, it would be wrong to think that education must slavishly follow every 
societal trend. Education both reflects and produces changes in its social contexts. 
While education systems can normally be expected to have some degree of 
synchronicity with the societies in which they are embedded, there can be no 
question that they should be restricted merely to reproducing their host societies. To 
accept such a credo would be to accept the legitimacy of schools in some 
ci rcumstances collaborating in totalitarianism or engaging in practices which are 
universally held to be repugnant. As Papadopolous (1995) stresses, 
In the turbulent world of today ... education becomes the main vehicle for maintaining and transmitting the 
basic values on which the cohesion of future societies depends. A certain abstraction from its immediate 
environment is thus essential for education ifit is to fulfill this role. 
This, of course, does not mean that education can be immune to the impact of conjuncturally driven 
decisions; and that it is important that educational systems should be equ ipped with greater flexibility and 
capacity to respond to new needs· which, admittedly, has not been their principal characteristic so far 
(p.495). 
A.s well as cultural transmission, education should have as a major goal the 
liberation of human minds, both intellectually and politically - a mix of ideals that 
is admittedly, in some circumstances, extraordinarily difficult to achieve. The thesis 
of this paper is that most education systems are lagging behind broad societal trends. 
Never before has society and education been so asynchronous in so many different 
ways and in so many different places. Indeed, in many countries, education neither 
reflects societal trends, nor liberates its students to critically engage such trends. It 
is as though educational policy-makers and practitioners are content with preparing 
students for a world that no longer exists, let alone is likely to return in the future. 
This is not good enough. 
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